Political attention in China is increasingly turning toward what comes after Xi Jinping, even though there is little indication that the Chinese president and Communist Party general secretary is preparing to leave power soon.
Xi is widely expected to seek a fourth term at the 21st Communist Party Congress in 2027. The growing succession discussion is instead focused on whether potential future leaders could emerge from the Politburo or its Standing Committee during that reshuffle.
The timing matters because a successor could eventually take over after Xi’s fourth term, potentially in 2032 or later. If Xi remains in office until 2035, as some analysts suggest, he will be 82.
Xi’s Political Timeline Extends Beyond 2027
Xi has set out a long-term objective of turning China into a “great modern socialist country in all respects” by 2049, linked to what the Communist Party describes as the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
The year 2035 has been presented as an important midpoint toward that broader goal. That has led some observers to consider whether Xi could seek to remain in political control until then.
Such a scenario would put Xi at the same age Mao Zedong was when Mao died in 1976. However, there is no confirmed indication that Xi has decided to remain in office until 2035.
The more immediate question is who could enter China’s top leadership ranks in 2027 and potentially become a future successor.
Politburo Standing Committee Faces Major Turnover
China’s current Politburo Standing Committee could undergo significant changes in 2027 because of the age of several members.
Premier Li Qiang will be 68 in 2027, while Ding Xuexiang, another Standing Committee member and an important figure in Xi’s administration, will be 65. Four other members will be over 70.
China has traditionally been associated with an informal retirement guideline known as “seven up, eight down,” under which officials aged 67 or younger could remain in senior positions while those aged 68 or older were expected to retire.
The convention, however, has become less predictable in recent years. It therefore remains uncertain how many Standing Committee and Politburo members will actually leave their positions in 2027.
Xi’s third term already broke with the earlier expectation that China’s top leader would eventually make way for a successor. The absence of an obvious heir has strengthened expectations that he will seek another term.
Why Xi’s Fourth Term Is Widely Expected
Most senior figures currently serving in China’s top political bodies have risen during Xi’s leadership. Analysts have also found few visible signs of an organized political challenge to his authority at the highest levels of the Communist Party.
There is dissatisfaction with government policies in parts of Chinese society and at the local level, but China’s extensive surveillance and political control make the emergence of a nationwide anti-government movement difficult.
The People’s Liberation Army is also undergoing major personnel changes. But there is currently little public evidence that the military is moving against Xi.
These factors have contributed to expectations that Xi will remain in power after the 2027 Party Congress.
Taiwan Could Become a Major Test
Some analysts argue that Xi may need to demonstrate significant achievements before securing another term.
The year 2027 will mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army, prompting speculation about whether China could take military action against Taiwan.
However, military action would carry major risks. A failed operation in the Taiwan Strait could create serious political consequences for Xi, making the issue particularly sensitive as he seeks another term.
There is no certainty that Beijing will choose military action in 2027, and the anniversary itself does not establish a timetable for conflict.
Military Succession Becomes More Complicated
Leadership changes inside the PLA have made China’s longer-term succession picture harder to assess.
Zhang Youxia, one of Xi’s longtime military allies and China’s most senior uniformed officer, has been removed from his position, according to the supplied analysis. His continued service after the 2022 Party Congress had already attracted attention because he was 72 at the time.
Following Zhang’s removal, the Central Military Commission’s leadership structure has become more concentrated around Xi and newly promoted Zhang Shengmin.
Zhang Shengmin, born in 1958, also serves as a deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and has played a prominent role in China’s anti-corruption campaign.
The significance of Zhang Youxia’s downfall remains uncertain. It could indicate greater consolidation of Xi’s authority over the military, or it could reflect tensions within China’s military command structure. So far, there is insufficient public evidence to establish either explanation conclusively.
Diplomatic Succession Also Faces Uncertainty
China could face similar challenges in preparing a new generation of senior diplomats.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi was born in 1953, the same year as Xi, and will be 74 in 2027. His age could therefore make a leadership transition in the diplomatic establishment increasingly relevant.
Potential successors have also faced setbacks. Qin Gang’s political career ended abruptly after a brief tenure as foreign minister, while Liu Jianchao, once viewed by some observers as a possible future figure in China’s foreign-policy establishment, has also faced uncertainty.
The difficulties surrounding military and diplomatic appointments highlight a broader problem for a political system dominated by one leader: identifying and preparing credible successors.
Younger Officials Emerge as Potential Successors
If Xi were to leave office in 2032 or 2035, potential successors would ideally be young enough to govern for a substantial period.
Officials born in the 1970s are therefore attracting greater attention. Someone born in 1972 would turn 60 in 2032, while someone born in 1967 would be 65.
Officials from the late 1960s, however, came of political age during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and their aftermath. Their backgrounds and exposure to Western ideas could make their political prospects more complicated under Xi’s leadership.
That has increased interest in younger provincial officials born during the 1970s.
Names that have circulated in discussions of China’s next generation include Zhuge Yujie, born in 1971 and serving as deputy secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee; Shi Guanghui, born in 1970 and serving as deputy secretary of Inner Mongolia; Yang Jinbai, born in 1973 and serving as deputy secretary of Hainan; Liu Hongjian, born in 1973 and serving as deputy secretary of Yunnan; and Zhu Zhongming, born in 1972 and serving as deputy secretary of Shanghai.
Other officials born in the 1970s also hold senior central-government positions, including Vice Foreign Minister Hua Chunying, born in 1970, and Miao Deyu, born in 1971.
2027 May Be About Succession Planning
The 2027 Party Congress is therefore likely to be watched not only for whether Xi secures a fourth term but also for which younger officials receive promotions into China’s top political institutions.
If officials from the 1970s enter the Politburo or Standing Committee, their appointments could provide clues about the Communist Party’s longer-term succession plans.
At the same time, recent upheavals in the military and diplomatic establishments show that senior appointments can change unexpectedly.
For now, the central question surrounding 2027 is not simply whether Xi Jinping will remain China’s leader. Increasing attention is being placed on which figures the Communist Party chooses to elevate and whether those appointments provide the first clearer indications of who could eventually succeed him.
