The twenty-first century has placed Asia at the heart of global politics, economy, and security. With its rising economies, demographic weight, and expanding military capabilities, the region now stands at a crossroads. Yet, many scholars and policymakers fear that Asia could repeat the trajectory of Europe’s past—a history shaped by rivalries, wars, and the collapse of great powers. This is one of the biggest debates of today’s international politics: will asia repeat the history of Europe?
Realism provides a sobering warning. Realists argue that in a world without a central authority, states must prioritize survival, power, and security. This pessimistic view sees war as not only possible but inevitable, especially when rising powers challenge existing hegemons. Today, this dynamic is most evident in the competition between the United States and China. Washington, long the dominant power in Asia-Pacific, faces Beijing’s rapid rise in military, technological, and economic domains. Disputes over Taiwan, naval confrontations in the South China Sea, and strategic competition in global trade routes reflect a classic power transition conflict. Graham Allison’s concept of the “Thucydides Trap” suggests that when a rising power threatens to displace an established one, the probability of war increases. Many realists argue that this is exactly where Asia is heading—towards a great-power conflict that could draw in allies and destabilize the region. In this sense, Asia may repeat Europe’s nineteenth- and twentieth-century experience, where rising and declining powers fought devastating wars.
The Russia–Ukraine war further deepens Asia’s vulnerability. Although fought on European soil, the war has triggered ripple effects across Asia, exposing how interconnected global conflicts have become. Rising oil and gas prices have hit energy-importing Asian countries like Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh hard. Sanctions on Russia have pushed Moscow to strengthen ties with China, Iran, and even North Korea, reshaping strategic alignments in Asia. At the same time, Japan and South Korea have tightened their security partnerships with the United States, while India carefully balances between Russia, its old defense partner, and the United States, a new strategic ally. The war demonstrates a realist reality: when great powers collide, smaller states are forced to adjust, often at the expense of their autonomy. Just as Europe’s alliances once dragged nations into catastrophic wars, Asia today faces the risk of entanglement in conflicts that begin elsewhere.
The India–Pakistan rivalry continues to cast a shadow over South Asia. The Kashmir dispute remains a flashpoint that could, under the wrong circumstances, escalate into armed conflict between two nuclear-armed neighbors. Realists view this as a permanent source of instability because both states prioritize territorial integrity and survival over compromise. This absence of cooperative frameworks reflects realism’s grim prediction that without trust and binding institutions, rivalry dominates.
The Middle East conflict between Israel and Palestine has added another layer of complexity to Asia’s stability. The ongoing war has not only caused immense humanitarian suffering but also threatened to destabilize the broader region. Asian countries are directly affected through oil market volatility, rising energy prices, and public opinion in Muslim-majority nations like Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, where the conflict shapes domestic politics and foreign policy.
At the same time, liberalism offers an alternative perspective that tempers this pessimism. Liberal theorists argue that interdependence, international institutions, and diplomacy can reduce the likelihood of war. Asia’s deep economic integration is a powerful example of this logic. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has tied dozens of Asian economies into shared infrastructure projects, while trade blocs like ASEAN and RCEP have created institutional platforms for cooperation. The fact that China and the United States, despite their rivalry, remain each other’s largest trading partners demonstrates how interdependence can restrain conflict. From a liberal perspective, war between nuclear-armed, economically integrated giants like the U.S. and China is not inevitable; the costs would simply be too high for both. Unlike Europe’s past, where nationalism and militarism outweighed trade, Asia’s economies are bound together in a way that makes war a self-destructive choice.
The danger, however, lies in the fact that Asia today reflects both Europe’s past conflicts and liberal attempts at cooperation. On one hand, realists point to the inevitability of war given the U.S.–China rivalry, unresolved territorial disputes, and the growing militarization of the region. On the other hand, liberals argue that Asia’s economic interdependence, the rising role of institutions, and the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons make war less likely. The outcome depends on which forces prevail. If mistrust, nationalism, and zero-sum thinking dominate, Asia could indeed repeat Europe’s bloody past. But if cooperation, diplomacy, and shared prosperity take center stage, Asia may chart a different course—one that avoids Europe’s mistakes.
The future of Asia will not be determined by theory alone but by choices made in the present. Realism warns of the dangers of an anarchic system where power dominates, reminding us of the destructive potential of unchecked rivalry. Liberalism, meanwhile, keeps alive the hope that dialogue, institutions, and economic ties can prevent catastrophe. The Russia–Ukraine war, the U.S.–China standoff, and South Asian disputes all show how fragile peace can be. Yet they also highlight opportunities for diplomacy and cooperation that could steer Asia toward stability. The past of Europe need not become the future of Asia—if leaders learn from history and resist the temptation to repeat it. The question remains whether rationality will prevail over rivalry and whether Asia’s leaders will embrace cooperation or fall into the traps that once destroyed Europe.
