The Indo pacific is the most dynamic region of the world not just because of its contested geography but various other reasons, prominent of which is its growing economy. Though geographical demarcation is a primary indicator for any state to formulate its respective perceptions of both threat and cooperation, Indo pacific is too complex and integrated to use the traditional markers for the policies that affect the region and drives its politics.
The region hold importance because it shelters seven largest militaries of the world and is home to three competing economies (China, India and Japan) and various smaller ones, conducting one third of global shipping through the South China Sea. By the end of cold war, the two inseparable oceans of the pacific and the Indian became ‘a cauldron of geopolitical competition as well as economic dynamism where the future of the world was to be determined’.
Historically, the term has been extensively used by the former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and in academia for dividing the Asia into regions; today, it is widely popular because of strong maritime military presence and economic competition. Though, proper delimitation of the indo pacific geography has not been defined either by academia or policy makers but two widely accepted understandings involve those of the ‘inclusionists’ who include China and Africa in the Indo-Pacific and the ‘exclusionists’ who would exclude them. Division aside, scholars like Medcalf adhere to the fact that this relatively new geographical construct is ‘a super-region in which the sub-regions still matter’ possessing their own ‘nasty strategic microclimates’.
The U.S.’s identifies itself as a Pacific nation in the region because of its acquisition of territories through historic conflicts and strategic maneuvers. The Spanish-American War in 1898 marked the beginning of this expansion, with the annexation of Guam and Hawai’i, and later, American Samoa. The aftermath of World War I heightened U.S. concerns about potential adversaries using northern Pacific islands to disrupt access to the Philippines or attack other Pacific territories. This fear materialized during World War II when Japan used these islands to launch attacks on U.S. bases. By 1944, US reclaimed these territories from Japan and in the post-war era, secured these regions under a United Nations trusteeship, leading to the creation of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
General Douglas MacArthur supported John Foster Dulles’ “Island Chain Strategy” in 1951, aiming to encircle China and the Soviet Union with U.S. naval base, viewing the Pacific as a protective moat. The concept of an “American lake” emerged, highlighting the need for U.S. control over the Pacific for security. During the late 1960s, the Nixon Doctrine shifted the U.S. defense perimeter to Guam and the Trust Territory. However, interest waned by the 1970s, and the U.S. focused more on economic ties within the Pacific Rim, sidelining Pacific Islands’ strategic importance. This neglect continued post-Cold War, with reduced diplomatic and aid presence in the region. The outcome was the establishment of the Compact of Free Association, granting the U.S. military base rights and external security control while offering these states economic aid and autonomy.
The U.S has opted the concept of Spatialization in the Pacific which, as discussed by scholars like Ferguson, and Gupta, involves embedding social relations and practices into physical and conceptual spaces, shaping a state’s territorial base. The U.S.’s efforts to establish itself as a Pacific nation reflect this, aiming to discipline Pacific Island countries and construct regional boundaries favoring U.S. and allied security interests while limiting adversaries, particularly China. The Obama administration emphasized the U.S.’s Pacific identity amid perceived competition with China for regional influence. Under Trump, the U.S. adopted the “Indo-Pacific” spatial descriptor, focusing on countering China. The 2017 National Security Strategy emphasized a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” with Pacific Island countries but the focus largely remained on states like India, Japan, and Australia.
Mutual gains come from military cooperation in the Pacific, but it also undermines confidence with important Indo-Pacific nations. Australia and the United States are perfect allies in security and development because of their strategic position and mutual competence. However, Indonesia and Malaysia are against the militaristic emphasis, which includes nuclear-powered submarines from AUKUS and raises questions about nuclear proliferation and regional security. The military’s presence in American Samoa and Guam further damages American reputations by implying that national interests take precedence over the needs of local people.
The Biden-Harris administration announced its strategy for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” region two years ago, which pledged for development of regional connectivity among friendly nations via trade and investment, and by establishing bilateral and multilateral partnerships among friends. The policy document is elaborative in highlighting the importance for a free and open indo pacific, building connections beyond the region and connecting indo pacific by making it secure, prosperous and resilient.
China was seen as oppressive in the Indo-Pacific strategy, which sought to curtail its influence. The United States made attempts to promote good governance and sovereignty while condemning China. Moreover, The Trump administration strengthened its ties with Pacific countries that recognize Taiwan in order to offset China’s sway and coerced states not to recognize China. In response to China’s security arrangement with the Solomon Islands, the Biden administration made threats of coercion if Chinese military presence was observed in the area. Proposals for legislation, such as the “Defund China’s Allies Act,” demonstrated the United States’ policy of discipline.
The U.S. has crafted a social imaginary of itself as a “Pacific nation,” based on historical narratives and shared values, and has implemented policies and diplomatic efforts to bring this imaginary into reality. Two main contradictions characterize the U.S. efforts: First, despite rhetoric about respect for sovereignty and shared values, the U.S.’s strategic interests often lead to actions that undermine these claims. Second, the U.S.’s front-stage diplomatic promises are not always backed by substantial backstage funding or policy execution. Third, U.S. aims to maintain regional dominance and security, often at the expense of local self-determination. While Pacific leaders have largely welcomed U.S. reengagement, there is diversity in regional responses such as engaging with Chinese regional integration proposals. Resultantly, US strategies have failed to link allies on the basis of extensive social, economic and political ties and has divided the region more than uniting it.
