The resurgence of militants in Swat has come into focus—why, who, and how. After the 2007 insurgency, the people of Swat, as well as the rest of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, were made to believe that the conflict had subsided and the militants were eliminated. The unrest and confrontation were believed to have been replaced by peace and harmony. There was hope that life in the scenic, serene valley would resume its previous rhythm.
Regrettably, the recent traumatic events happening in Swat—taking hostages, police extortion, targeted killings, and instilling constant real terror in the people—are surely a bad omen. The deteriorating law and order situation and a sense of insecurity have affected every walk of life, especially the commercial sector, particularly the tourism industry, taking a toll on everyone besides the life threats.
The genesis of preaching Shariah in the Malakand Division came to the fore in 1989, reaching its zenith by 1994, when the self-styled leading figure, the late Sufi Muhammad of District Dir, gave the call for violent mass protests and disobedience, which resulted in several deaths, including that of a sitting MPA. The movement, Shariat Nifaz-e-Muhammadi, surfaced as a substitute for the regular law of the country, which was enforced in the Malakand Division after the PATA Regulation No. 1 & 2 of 1975 were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the judgment titled “Govt: of NWFP VS Muhammad Irshad and others,” reported as PLD 1995 SC 281. After negotiations, a regulation named Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Shariah 1994, followed by Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 1999 and Shari Nizam-e-Adl Act 1999, were promulgated. Both laws enforced Islamic law with an overriding effect, and the courts operated under these fully Shariah-compliant procedures.
The 2007 insurgency, led by Maulana Fazliullah, was preceded by mosque sermons and FM radio broadcasts, initially professing to eradicate social evils and promote virtue and justice. Within a year, their approach changed to armed squads displaying and carrying lethal weapons, roaming the roads and public places, and instilling terror. Soon afterward, they launched attacks on local elders, police personnel, and political workers and leaders, dubbing them non-believers. The death toll in Swat reached hundreds, in addition to casualties in the rest of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The militants evoked the sensitivities of the people, making them responsive to their calls for salvation from a cruel, unjust system of governance and promising a right and just system of Shariah.
The militants’ slogans partly gained traction due to the weariness of Swat’s people with the lengthy, ineffective, and fruitless legal procedures of the courts, particularly delays and defective investigations of criminal cases. People of Swat proudly recalled the state’s era of inexpensive, speedy, and effective justice and governance. Additionally, the population was led to believe that the present cruel and unjust system of governance, particularly in Malakand Division, was being replaced by Shariah, which was portrayed as a panacea for all problems.
A portion of the population saw the militants as messiahs, capable of salvaging them from the cruel system. To this end, the militants justified killings, beheadings, and targeting police, notables, and political activists. However, they soon showed their true colors, sparing no one; even a lady said to be a dancer was killed in Mingora.
Surprise attacks, like the one on the DPO Swat near the Police Line Bypass in Mingora, gave the impression that the magnitude of the conflict was so high that the provincial police force was helpless. This led people to believe that only the army could confront and defeat the militants. Eyeing this, the militants attacked notables of the area, such as Mr. Afzal Khan Lala, who survived an ambush near Shakardara, Matta. The home of former District Nazim Mr. Jamal Nasar was looted and plundered. Also, Shahzada Asfandyar, a member of Swat’s royal family, was martyred.
The message was clear: if these notables were not safe, no one was safe, and army intervention was the only solution. The army eventually moved into Swat, and for a considerable time, both the Taliban and the army showed their presence simultaneously. Confusion and unrest spread regarding the state’s narrative, yet people refrained from questioning the government’s uncertain and hesitant conduct of the situation. Although there was criticism, people remained content with the phrase, “the state’s interest may necessitate this.”
Conscious of the situation, elders convened the Swat Qaumi Jirga, which voiced the concerns of the people. Jirgas, press conferences, and public meetings were organized at the district level. As required, people were displaced for three months in May 2009. The army operation was declared successful, and the militants were declared eliminated.
Yet another law, the Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation of 2009, was promulgated, reiterating the supremacy of Shariah. The displaced people of Swat returned home, and life slowly returned to normal. However, the area remained under army control, with checkposts, body searches, and interrogations. On 22nd October 2018, control of the area was handed over to civil administration, and by then, the situation had apparently improved. People thought the monster of darkness and destruction had been overcome by the military.
Sadly, after 13 years of peace, nearly two and a half months ago, on 8th August 2022, in the Chuprial area of Matta Tehsil, a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) was trapped, abducted, tortured, and released after ransom and other negotiated terms were fulfilled by the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the act. This incident was followed by the murder of Idrees Khan of Bandai and the self-professed encounter in Takhtaband Bypass, Mingora, where two locals were killed in an alleged shootout, while two army personnel were reportedly injured.
The provincial government responded by stating they were engaged with TTP and had pacified them through reciprocal terms, resulting in a peaceful settlement. Strangely, this time the TTP did not disguise themselves as preachers of Shariah but resorted to criminal acts without their usual sermons. However, they reiterated their resolve to eliminate nationalists, Khans, and government servants.
Fortunately, the Swat Qaumi Jirga has risen to the occasion and asserted the grievances of the people by organizing public rallies and protests and explaining the situation through social and traditional media. As a result, the masses have become emboldened enough to refute the narrative of the militants and their sponsors. In response, the TTP has issued life threats to some of the area leaders.
One aspect of the matter is that the TTP claims to be fighting for the enforcement of Islamic law. The validity of this statement needs examination. As regards the personal law of Muslims, its distinction was recognized even by the British during their rule in India, as the Punjab Laws Act of 1872 regulated the affairs of Muslims according to their personal law, e.g., matrimonial issues, inheritance, and related matters. Later, these matters were covered by the NWFP Shariat Application Act 1935, followed by the West Pakistan Shariat Application Act 1962, as amended in 1991.
During the Zia-ul-Haq regime, four ordinances (Hudood Ordinances) were promulgated, covering subjects such as zina, theft, robbery, qazf (false accusation of fornication), and prohibition of drinking. General penal laws in Pakistan have also been Islamized, particularly in areas such as offences against the human body, which underwent substantial changes in the Pakistan Penal Code. Likewise, the Evidence Act was reviewed and aligned with Islamic principles.
Furthermore, civil laws like the Limitation Act, Contract Act, and Preemption Act have also been Islamized, and no laws in Pakistan contradict Islamic injunctions. Two specific provisions—interest (riba) in eleven acts and Section 4 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1961—have been held contrary to Islamic law by the Federal Shariat Court, with decisions pending in the Supreme Court.
As for the causes of recurring militancy in Swat, the future appears somewhat dismal yet not insurmountable. One sensitive aspect of militancy in the name of religion is rooted in an unhappy historical development. Pakistan, though created in the name of Islam, had a socially liberal and politically secular founder. However, after its creation, Pakistan aligned its interests with the capitalist world, particularly the United States, which sought to contain the USSR along Pakistan’s western border. During the early years, Pakistan developed relations with the U.S., and hatred was preached against the USSR, labeled as infidel, while the West was accepted as “people of the book.”
This stance worked effectively and became a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. This viewpoint peaked when a progressive revolution occurred in Afghanistan, followed by Soviet troop intervention. Pakistan’s interests were said to have converged with the capitalist world, particularly the U.S. Mujahideen were organized, equipped with sophisticated weaponry, and Afghanistan’s development was thwarted through sabotage.
Islamic outfits were also organized for liberating Kashmir from Indian control. This gained further momentum when the Geneva Accord was signed on 14th April 1988, necessitating disengagement from Afghanistan’s Mujahideen and their redeployment in the Kashmir Jihad. These militants, often labeled as anti-state elements internally, were considered valuable assets by external forces. The Mujahideen of Afghanistan fought the Afghan government with active support from the West, ultimately leading to the ousting and assassination of President Dr. Najibullah.
As Abbas Nasir, the ex-editor of Dawn newspaper, described them, the Mujahideen were “disposable tools of the establishment.” They were later replaced by the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP), who overthrew the Afghan government in 2021 and are said to enjoy support from Pakistan. The ideological foundation for these Islamic militant groups is bolstered by the state’s narrative that “Pakistan is the fort of Islam, and by extension, its armed forces are its soldiers.” This indoctrination has been effective.
For the corridors of power, Pakistan is styled as liberal internationally, while for the masses in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it presents itself as a theocratic state. The state’s continued engagement in a controlled conflict along the western border, with a multifaceted agenda, implies that a complete elimination of these groups does not suit the power structure. This delicate balance is seen as necessary for the power elites.
In contrast, the strategy for political and social activists who support real federalism, constitutional supremacy, and the rule of law in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa requires a comprehensive struggle. Genuine political workers, in collaboration with rights groups, civil society, and journalists, must raise their voices against insurgency and terror. The only effective way to counter the militants’ narrative is to refute their stance. Insurgency benefits no one; it shatters the social fabric and obstructs progress and development. It disrupts everyday life.
Activists, as the torchbearers of society, must organize rallies, protests, and demonstrations, utilizing both traditional and social media to present the true nature of the situation. Irrational praise for the establishment is counterproductive, and the so-called heroism of adventurers in the name of the “war on terror” no longer benefits anyone and must be reassessed. The West is unlikely to support or finance such projects anymore. The only long-term solution to terrorism is through educating the people, despite the fact that it will be a long, trying, and difficult struggle. However, if the people are united, this goal is not far off.
