Pak-US relations after 9/11 attacks

The 9-11, 2001, incident brought in an exceedingly third-time US-Pakistan strategic alliance. Now once the incident, the United States launched the GWOT to wipe out Al-Qaeda’s violent structure, which was based mostly within the Taliban-controlled Asian nation. so as to set up military dealings against the base militants and also the Taliban regimen, the executive sought the help of an Asian nation, a proximate neighbor of an Asian nation. Moreover, Pakistan’s consequence and duty, importantly once the Soviet entrance of Asian nation in December 1979, in Afghan politics hedged it to become the main US ally within the GWOT. so as to hunt Islamabad’s help within the GWOT, the United States adopted a really hard-and-fast policy.

In an Associate in Nursing interview show on CBS TV in Sept 2006, then Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf, revealed that once the 9/11 attacks, in his speech with Lt. General Mahmud Ahmed, then head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, Richard Armitage, the then United States Deputy Secretary of State, vulnerable to bomb Asian nation back to the Stone Age, if it failed to now flip against its Afghan ally, Taliban, and permit the United States to use military bases in Asian nation to invade Asian nation. In his address to a joint session of Congress on Sept twenty, 2001, President Bush warned that: “Every nation, in each region, currently contains a call to make: Either you’re with United States, otherwise you are with the terrorists. From these days forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorist act are regarded by the u. s. as a hostile regime.”6 This was a transparent message for a rustic Asian nation, that was a lively actor in Afghanistan’s internal politics.

For the capital of Pakistan, it had been a very onerous call to sever ties with the religious movement, that was created and nurtured by the Asian nation so as to secure its strategic interests in Afghanistan. Following the extreme yank pressure, the Asian nations had no alternative possibility, but to bandwagon with the U.S. As a result, the Asian nations joined the US-led GWOT and accepted the yank demands of retreating its recognition to the religious movement regime in Afghanistan and start a quelling on the militant teams and Base militants. whereas vindicating Pakistan’s call, Perwez Musharraf in his speech to the state on Sep nineteen, 2001, clearly said:

“In such a scenario a wrong call will cause unaffordable losses, what square measure our vital issues and necessary priorities? These square measure, 1st of all is that the security of the country from external threats. Second is our economy and our efforts for its survival. Third priority is our strategic, nuclear, and missile assets and at last, the geographic region cause”.

According to Lawrence Ziring, “To defy the u. s. within the aftermath of the horrific events of September 11 would be to put the Asian nations in direct association with the actions of Base. Moreover, at this juncture, there was no separating AL terrorist group from the religious movement, and the capital of Pakistan was forced to settle between being known as a co-conspirator with the named band of terrorists, or connecting the yank entailing the cutting of ties to the regime of a political leader. Musharraf was additionally forced to speculate the choice to neutralize the foremost militants of the Islamist organizations operative in Pakistan.”

Political support for military regime:

At the time of the Sept. 11, 2001, incident, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was within the grip of military rule. Musharraf’s military regime, which had been facing world isolation attributable to the overthrowing of the civilian democratic government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif in Oct 1999, was in dire want of world legitimacy. The regime was additionally under international pressure to revive democracy in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. However, the case was fully modified once Pakistan’s connection with the US-led GWOT. Musharraf rose to the standing of the world’s standard leader as several dignitaries visited the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and guaranteed their support to the Musharraf regime. These enclosed, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, the U.S. Secretary of State, general, the U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, and also the foreign ministers of France and Turkey.

Ironically, the Washington-Islamabad cooperation within the GWOT was at the expense of democracy in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Anxious to legalize his position as Pakistan’s President, and to safeguard the company interests of the Pakistani military that might be vulnerable in an exceedingly American campaign against international terrorist acts, Musharraf acquiesced speedily to any or all the strain that America placed before him. In thus doing, he sent a really necessary signal to the U.S.: ‘you facilitate Maine, and I can facilitate you’. In the short term, this strategy worked. virtually instantly, he was remodeled from being the supplanted of Pakistani democracy and also the villain of Kargil WHO was resolute on wresting Kashmir from Bharat, into a robust ally of the accumulation WHO was a key partner within the fight against international terrorist acts.

The Bush administration, reciprocally, shunned criticizing Musharraf to revive democracy in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Moreover, throughout Musharraf’s visit to America in the Gregorian calendar month of 2004, the Bush administration even declined to lift the question of shedding his uniform. Instead, President Bush expressed his support and lauded the Pakistani President for ‘very strong’ cooperation with us and ‘focused efforts’ to combat terrorist acts. By providing full support, the Bush administration had clearly aforementioned that it absolutely was not viewing the Islamic Republic of Pakistan while not General Pervez Musharraf as president. In an Associate in a Nursing interview with The big apple Post, then Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, clearly aforementioned, “Musharraf dramatically modified the orientation of the country once 9/11 and is set to extirpate political orientation. We’ve arrived in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, with this explicit leader, somebody WHO has tried to extirpate a number of the political orientation that came into the Islamic Republic of Pakistan primarily once the USSR was defeated in Afghanistan…who could be a smart ally within the war on terror.”

Funneling of American economic and military aid:

It is true that the delicate condition of Pakistan was additionally one of the explanations to work with the North American country within the GWOT. Pakistan, which had been facing economic and military sanctions, obligatory by the North American country and alternative donor countries for conducting nuclear tests in might 1998 and the military’s derailing of democratic method in Oct 1999, had badly required help to swimmingly run the state affairs. With the extension of Islamabad’s cooperation within the GWOT, the Yankee Congress not solely raised those sanctions, but additionally poured substantial economic and military aid into Pakistan. in step with the legislative assembly analysis Service (CRS) Report of might 2012, “By the tip of 2011, Congress had condemned regarding $15.3 billion in obvious help over 10 years, together with over $8.3 billion in development and humanitarian aid, and nearly $7 billion for security-related programs.”

Similarly, acknowledging Pakistan’s contributions within the GWOT, the U.S. in 2004 selected Pakistan as a significant non-NATO ally, a standing below that a rustic is exempted from the suspension of the North American country military help and qualifies to receive surplus defense material from North American country stockpiles. However, there’s no long-run commitment to the continuation of the help to Pakistan once the GWOT is over. The Yankee conceitedness vis-à-vis Pakistan can be seen throughout the recent standoff between the 2 countries. The North American country not solely suspended the compensation of Pakistan’s dues below the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), but additionally withheld $33 million of condemned Foreign Military funding (FMF) funds as a reaction to the subsidization of thirty-three years imprisonment by a Pakistani court to Dr. Shakil Afridi for his alleged role in tracing terrorist through a faux vaccination campaign.

US role in normalizing India-Pakistan relations:

The 9/11 incident and as a result, the launching of American-led military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan has made the US a regional actor in South Asian affairs. For the success of the GWOT, the US is very keen to see cordial, friendly, and tension-free relations between neighboring states of South As, It is interesting to note that the US was a driving force behind the beginning of the Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan in January 2004. In order to bring India and Pakistan to the negotiating table and to pave the way for normalizing their relations after the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the US Deputy Secretary, Richard Armitage, visited South Asia in May 2003. Mr. Armitage’s major focus was on Pakistan’s efforts for stopping cross-border terrorism in Kashmir in order to satisfy India, which accused Pakistan-based militant groups of their involvement in the December 13, 2001, carnage.

It is a fact that the US would not remain unconcerned if any dangerous situation, which may sabotage its military operations in Afghanistan, arises between India and Pakistan. Although the US firmly believes that the success of the war against international terrorism depends upon the friendly relations between India and Pakistan, it has so far failed to devise any effective mechanism to address and resolve the outstanding disputes, including the Kashmir issue, which is the primary cause of tension between Islamabad and New Delhi. The American efforts have been related only to easing tension and conflict management rather than conflict resolution between the two neighboring states of South Asia, with a history of tensions, crises, and wars.

References:

1.  K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress (May 24, 2012).
2.  Quoted in Eric S. Margolis, “Pervez Musharraf had little choice”, Daily Times, (October 2, 2006).
3.  Quoted in “11 September 2001: The Response”, House of Commons Library (London), Research Paper 01/72, (October 3, 2001).
4.  Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History (Lahore: Vanguard, 2004)
5. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire (New York: Free Press, 2006).
6.  Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Stage Set for Final Showdown”, Asia Times Online, (July 21, 2004).