US-China competition in the evolution of Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific

The Asia-Pacific region includes major players such as Southeast Asia, East Asia, Australia, and the US, which counter China’s influence in the South China Sea. The Asia-Pacific has a large market in terms of production and sales, major economies, technological advancements, and is crucial in terms of cybersecurity and AI. It is also a crucial passageway for international trade, with resources like oil, gas, and minerals, exemplified by the Asian Tigers.

This region operates through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which fosters connectivity through trade facilitation. Now, the scope of this region is expanding to the Indo-Pacific, including the Indian peninsula. The USA is interested in including India as a natural balancer to China. However, different players in the Indo-Pacific have varying geographical views based on their interests.

According to Samuel P. Huntington, there is a power struggle between the Western and non-Western world, as the world is influenced by Western norms due to the domination of institutions like the UN and WTO, which pursue liberal institutionalism to achieve realist agendas.

Confucian China is currently engaged in a power struggle with the USA. To counter this, China is reviving the ancient Silk Road through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which began in 2013, aiming to connect Europe, Asia, and Africa to facilitate trade. Similarly, the US initiated a project in 2019 called Build Back Better World (B3W), which succeeded the Blue Dot Network. Both initiatives offer opportunities for developing states but also risk creating dependency through debt traps.

Currently, rolling back the BRI is difficult for B3W. The USA is also influencing the Indo-Pacific region with initiatives like AUKUS and QUAD. Regarding AUKUS, it is a defensive alliance among the US, UK, and Australia. One of its pillars is based on the US and UK helping Australia acquire its first conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Although the NPT does not define nuclear submarines as proscribed military weapons, it is essential to note that nuclear submarines based in the US and UK are fueled by weapons grade uranium that is 90 percent or above enriched.

Exporting enriched weapons-grade uranium creates a risk of HEU being diverted
to make nuclear weapons. Since this can easily be converted into a nuclear bomb, the IAEA must ban it because it does not fall under the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. South Korea and Japan view this military pact as discriminatory, feeling they are more deserving of this initiative by the US and UK. In 2020, South Korea announced its intention to build a nuclear submarine, and Japan also raised its defense budget, feeling a threat from the South Pacific Ocean.

China has claimed at the IAEA Conference on Disarmament and in the UN General Assembly that AUKUS will undermine regional peace and lead to nuclear proliferation. The USA pressurizes Iran not to enrich uranium above 70 percent while giving SSNs to Australia, which are fueled by at least 90 percent enriched uranium. This could lead to a security dilemma and spark an arms race in the region. QUAD is another strategy through which America exerts power in the region. It involves security dialogues between the US, India, Japan, and Australia.

This group was first introduced in 2004 when all four powers sent humanitarian assistance following the Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquake. The United States has sought a policy of “soft containment” of China by organizing strategic partnerships with democracies on its periphery. In 2007, dialogues were initiated between the four members, introducing QUAD 1.0, which focused on traditional security domains, including Malabar exercises, but it was not officially organized by QUAD.

This QUAD 1.0 ceased in 2008 due to Australia’s withdrawal under pressure from China. In 2017, QUAD 2.0 was reinitiated, focusing on economic cooperation but failed due to the heavy economic dependency of members on China. QUAD members have security concerns about China; joining QUAD, which China terms as “Asian NATO,” might compromise their economic and strategic
security.

Economically, both Japan and Australia depend on China as a major trade partner, and
both countries have security concerns about China’s technological advancements and its
influence in the South and East China Sea. Therefore, both Japan and Australia pursue a hedging policy but simultaneously fear China’s assertiveness. India has always avoided explicitly using the term “QUAD,” preferring “India, Japan, US, Australia meeting” to reassure China while engaging with QUAD, following a strategy of evasive balancing. Most members of QUAD don’t want an exclusive alliance to avoid provoking China.

In 2021, QUAD 3.0 was initiated, focusing on nontraditional security domains and COVID-19. It is not fully institutionalized yet, but if it becomes so, it could bring a new strategic order of a hub-and-spoke system in the Indo-Pacific, with the US as the super hub country and other QUAD members as semi-hubs: Japan in charge of Northeast Asia and some parts of Southeast Asia, India of South Asia, and Australia of Oceania and some parts of Southeast Asia.

This could undermine the strategic autonomy of smaller powers in the region. Currently, Western norms dominate the world, and according to Samuel P. Huntington, this dominance will continue with a slow decline. While at the same time, China is introducing initiatives like the Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) to create an atmosphere that serves China’s interests.

China has risen as a geo-economic and geopolitical power, making it more conscious of its security. These Chinese-led initiatives are based on the liberal values of social and economic development, especially in the global south, and are associated with President Xi’s catchphrase, “fostering a community of shared future for mankind.”

These initiatives support China in safeguarding its interests and opposing unilateralism, protectionism, and U.S. hegemony. GDI and GSI are related to U.S.-led institutions, as GDI connects to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, while GSI responds to QUAD and AUKUS. China does not believe in alliance building against anyone, but the US does. Thus, the operationalization of QUAD/AUKUS will impact their members’ economies due
to dependency on China.

China has risen as a global power, demonstrating rapid economic growth and becoming the US’s largest trading partner and a key player in international markets. Militarily, China modernizes selectively, focusing on cyber warfare, long-range missiles, and naval technology. While traditionally aiming for mutual integration, US policy shifted under Obama to contain China’s influence, and Trump labeled China a “revisionist power.” The Trump administration, adopting a realist approach, launched a trade war to counter perceived predatory market practices, jeopardizing the economic partnership—one of the main pillars of US-China cooperation.

In the South China Sea, China perceives the US military presence in the region as a threat to its growth and aims to establish a sphere of influence. Strategically, the South China Sea is vital for US forces, and the US contends that Chinese actions undermine freedom of movement, crucial for trade and diplomacy in the region. However, conflict between the US and China may not escalate into military confrontations, and the power transition could be peaceful for three reasons. Firstly, states are now more concerned about economic prosperity. India and China are big rivals but also major trade partners, and the same applies to the US.

Additionally, China is more interested in investing in projects like the BRI rather than wars. Secondly, Chinese Confucian values do not support wars and interventions. History proves this, as China has not intervened in any state since the Korean War in 1950. Lastly, liberal institutionalism can play a part. Institutional settings that abide by norms can foster cooperation through trade, and institutional competition may create complex interdependencies globally.