Why Science and Philosophy Need Each Other
Comparing philosophical and scientific understanding in relation to philosophy.
Both science and philosophy are methods for learning about the self and the outside world.
Here, we will examine the two basic viewpoints on the issue of whether and to what extent science and philosophy share knowledge sources and methodologies.
Let’s name the historically prevalent stance on the nature of philosophy “rationalism.” After reviewing this traditional viewpoint, we’ll analyse a more recent opinion on what philosophy is or should be, “naturalism.”
1. The Conventional Perspective: Rationalism
A priori, or simply by thinking about the topics, is how most, if not all, of our distinctly philosophical opinions are created and justified, according to rationalism regarding philosophy itself.
For example, we know a priori that all even numbers are exactly divisible by two; we don’t need to conduct scientific experiments to learn that fact. If you know a fact a priori, you already know it independently of, or before, any kind of empirical, sensory-based, or perceptual observation of that fact. A priori research would not be sufficient to determine if there are an equal number of planets in the solar system; we would instead need empirical, sensory, or experience-based data.
It will reveal a lot about the differences between science and philosophy if we believe that defining philosophical ideas may be justified or known a priori (if and when they are justified or known). Here’s an overview of how we could do the comparisons:
Philosophy is often about that but also about a priori knowledge. Science is about empirical knowledge (if it exists).
Philosophy is frequently about that, but it is also about necessary truths. Science is about contingent facts or truths (if they exist).
Philosophy is often about those things, but it is also about normative and evaluative truths. Science is about descriptive facts (if such truths exist).
Philosophy is often about that, but it is also about abstract objects. Science is about physical objects (if they exist).
Contingent facts are actual facts that are the case but weren’t required to be; they could have been otherwise. In contrast, necessary truths are true statements that must be true. While normative and evaluative truths speak to how things should or shouldn’t be, as well as their goodness and badness, descriptive facts speak to how things actually are. Physical objects are, well, it’s hard to say, but maybe they’re things that are formed of matter and have places in space and time; abstract objects, if they exist, are in some way outside the realm of the physical.
The word “also” appears twice in the previous sentence. Even while science is primarily concerned with these, contingent, descriptive, and physical truths are frequently addressed in philosophy. A few philosophers have disputed the existence of a priori knowledge, necessary truths, normative truths, and abstract objects. Also note the repeated use of the parenthetical “if they exist.”
Examining the conventional concept of philosophy’s purview lends credence to this method of contrasting philosophy and science. Metaphysics (the nature, structure, and contents of reality), epistemology (the nature and extent of knowledge and evidence), and ethics (good, bad, right, and wrong), generally speaking, are considered to be the three primary sub-areas of philosophy.
If true, that would satisfy the definition of rationalism given above well. The main topics of metaphysics are abstract concepts and required truths. The arguably normative and evaluative problems of what we ought to believe—what are we entitled to believe, what do we know, and is knowledge preferable to true beliefs—are the subject of epistemology. Furthermore, ethics is unmistakably normative because it deals with evaluative issues of right and wrong.
There is no necessity to conduct scientific experiments in laboratories, and it is unclear what such experiments may entail, if there is any information or justifiable belief regarding these matters.
2. A Fresher Approach: Naturalism
Philosophers use the word “naturalism” in a variety of contexts; in this case, we’re talking about what can be referred to as “metaphilosophical” naturalism. Accordingly, this theory is a naturalism about philosophy itself, not just about a particular philosophical problem or subject; it is a philosophical view of philosophy.
We might also infer from the term “naturalism” that there is some sort of connection between philosophy and the natural and social sciences. This could imply, for instance, that classical philosophical concerns are applicable to scientific observations, such as those from cosmology or neurology.
The majority of philosophers concur that science can shed significant light on philosophical issues, and some even contend that empirical science should largely replace philosophy. For example, perhaps we should simply believe everything our best scientific theories have to say about reality, and if they have nothing to say about some long-standing philosophical issue, then we won’t say anything about that either. This perspective may also be referred to as “naturalism.”
It will be more challenging to describe philosophy by simply contrasting it with science if we accept concepts like naturalism as stated in either of these approaches. However, if we just substitute “traditionally, “philosophy,” has been more about” for each instance of “philosophy is also about” in the bulleted list above, we will arrive at an answer that almost all philosophers, including naturalists, would accept.
Most naturalists would agree that their perspective is relatively new on the scene and that we should use science to explore traditional philosophical issues. They acknowledge that traditionally, philosophers have viewed their field as being largely pursued through the application of reason, conceptual inquiry, logic, and intuition.
In general, philosophy course topics can be defined by comparing them to the subjects and approaches of the scientific and social sciences.
Are philosophical questions ultimately better suited for a priori investigation, or are they better suited to be viewed as the subjects of scientific observation? Understanding how naturalists and rationalists respond to this question and contrasting their arguments might help us comprehend and refine our own philosophy of philosophy.
