In May 1974, India tested its first nuclear bomb, called Operation Smiling Buddha. Pakistan’s leaders responded strongly, vowing never to give in to nuclear threats or let India dominate the region. In 1998, both India and Pakistan tested nuclear bombs, making South Asia openly nuclear-armed. These tests balanced power between the two countries and created nuclear deterrence, meaning both sides avoid war because of the threat of total destruction. Nuclear weapons have secured Pakistan against a conventionally stronger India, while its civil nuclear program has made significant strides in energy, agriculture, medicine, and industry, contributing to socioeconomic development.
Most Pakistani scholars believe that nuclear weapons deter Indian aggression and that the primary aim of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is to use them for political means; deterrence, not to fight wars. Since 1998, South Asia has avoided big wars because of nuclear deterrence. But it hasn’t stopped smaller conflicts, like the Kargil war in 1999, military buildups in 2001-2002, and the 2019 Balakot airstrikes. These conflicts show the danger of small fights possibly leading to nuclear war. While non-Pakistani analysts suggest Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions are driven by prestige and aspirations to lead the Islamic world, alongside deterrence against India. Peter Lavoy highlights Pakistan’s opposition to Indian hegemony, prioritizing defense, and minimal reliance on external help.
He suggests Pakistan’s security policy is influenced by strategic myths and mythmakers.
The Pakistani nuclear doctrine seeks to maintain strategic balance, neutralize military disparities with India, protect territorial integrity, and uphold political sovereignty. Given the conventional military imbalance and lack of strategic depth, Pakistan threatens nuclear use to deter large-scale Indian invasions. Pakistan’s nuclear policy ensures enough nuclear capability to survive a first strike. Publicly, leaders emphasize deterring external aggression without engaging in an arms race with India. Pakistan does not follow a No-First-Use (NFU) policy and reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if its existence is threatened. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) oversees the nuclear arsenal, supported by the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and Strategic Forces Commands (SFC).
To counter India’s aggressive plans, Pakistan uses a full-spectrum deterrence strategy, which means being ready for all types of threats while keeping nuclear weapons as a last resort. Pakistan also relies on strong conventional military forces, political stability, economic strength, public support, and diplomatic efforts. Pakistan’s concept of full-spectrum deterrence has effectively countered India’s plans to quickly penetrate Pakistani territory under the Cold Start or proactive doctrine. However, India’s claimed surgical strikes following the Pulwama attack in February 2019 marked the first aerial clash between the two nations since their nuclearization.
The Pulwama/Balakot crisis, where Pakistan successfully responded to Indian aerial aggression, has led to differing interpretations by both countries. India believes it has found a method to strike Pakistan under the nuclear threat, while Pakistan asserts that its effective response neutralized the vulnerabilities India aimed to exploit.
The 2019 aerial conflict between the two nuclear-armed states emphasized the need to distinguish between theater-tactical-level deterrence and strategic deterrence. It also highlighted the importance of conventional deterrence at the initial stage of escalation. Pakistan’s successful response in 2019 demonstrated that its initial conventional response is effective, despite perceived weaknesses in a prolonged conventional war.
To strengthen tactical-theater deterrence in the evolving strategic landscape, Pakistan needs to further enhance its conventional military capabilities. This will not only reinforce Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence but also align with Islamabad’s policy of seamlessly integrating nuclear and conventional military strategies, using nuclear weapons only as a last resort.
Since 2013, Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine addresses the full range of threats from India, ensuring strategic stability in South Asia. Pakistan has developed Babar-3 cruise missiles for second-strike capability and Ababeel missiles with Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) to counter India’s BMD. Pakistan has a robust nuclear command and control system, stringent export controls, and a commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation.
Its civil nuclear achievements include six operational reactors generating 3440 MW, with plans to reach 8,800 MW by 2030 and 40,000 MWe by 2050. Nuclear technology aids in achieving UN Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs), with significant contributions in health and agriculture. Internationally, Pakistan cooperates with the IAEA and has established centers of excellence for nuclear security and training. Pakistan has adjusted its nuclear policies to keep its deterrence effective despite India’s military progress.
Since 2001-2002, India has pursued two main strategies. Diplomatically, it has accused Pakistan of supporting terrorism in India, using these allegations to avoid bilateral discussions aimed at resolving issues. Meanwhile, Pakistan has found it difficult to secure international backing on terrorism accusations against India. Additionally, India has been enhancing its conventional military capabilities, aiming to find a way to strike Pakistan despite the nuclear threat. This includes advancing its doctrine of limited conflict and moving toward a nuclear war-fighting stance, even considering preemptive counterforce first strikes against Pakistan.
Pakistan has made several international non-proliferation treaties but conditions its policies on Indian stance. Bilateral proposals, such as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and test bans, have seen little reciprocity from India. For example, they agreed not to attack each other nuclear sites (1988), to prevent airspace violations (1991), and other steps to build trust. Nuclear use thresholds include significant territorial breaches, major military losses, economic blockades, and severe political instability. Planning involves flexible responses, with potential nuclear targets ranging from military formations to major cities. But new technologies like AI and hypersonic missiles create new challenges for nuclear stability.
It’s very important for India and Pakistan to talk to each other to avoid nuclear risks, understand each other’s nuclear strategies, and deal with mutual threats. This will help keep the region stable and prevent dangerous escalations.
